Abstract-Security and privacy issues are critically important in RFID networks because EPC data and their associated business events are valuable assets. In this paper, an Interoperable Internet-Scale Security (IISS) framework for RFID networks is proposed. The IISS framework performs authentication and authorization based on an aggregation of business rules, enterprise information, and RFID tag information. IISS provides a protocol for several authentication schemes and identity techniques. It also provides an engine for reasoning over business rules from different domains. Moreover, the IISS framework is able to resolve provenance information of RFID tags, which can identify the history of a particular piece of EPC data through the supply chain. The IISS framework and the IISS ontologies to model the information in RFID networks are also described, and how the IISS framework can be developed for access control in RFID enabled supply chains is discussed. Finally, the IISS framework's efficiency is tested using a supply chain EPC simulator as the testing platform, which allows optimization of the IISS protocol's performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) was invented in 1946, RFID technology has had widespread application, including electronic passports, transportation payments, and inventory systems. As RFID deployment continues to increase, its associated applications have become more and more network-centric. Most tags are used in supply chains where the Electronic Product Code (EPC) and associated business event data are transmitted through RFID networks. The design of RFID network thus plays a critical role in successfully deploying large-scale applications.
Security and privacy issues are critically important for RFID networks. Companies need to share these data with a restricted set of their business partners and, in some cases, such as product recall, more widely with regulators and non-business partners. Moreover, EPC event data are valuable corporate assets. A company is likely to only share them with certain trading partners under special conditions. This evidence points to a need for a security framework for RFID networks. However, at present, no specific security or privacy framework has been specified as part of the the EPCglobal 1 standard [1] . The lack of agreement on a specific 1 EPCglobal is leading the development of industry-driven standards for the Electronic Product Code (EPC) to support the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in todays fast-moving, information rich, trading networks. security framework in RFID networks is mainly due to the following three problems. The first problem is that RFID networks, supply chains in particular, are open world-wide systems. It is hard to make mandatory adoption of a particular identity system or a certificate authority for all such participants [2] .
The second problem in standardizing RFID security is that there are trust problems in RFID networks. For example, a manufacturer sells a product to a distributor, and the distributor sells that product to a retailer. If a manufacturer wants to trace its products and requests particular EPC information from retailers, those retailers must decide whether they should give access permission to the manufacturer even though they do not have a direct business relationship.
The final difficulty in establishing a uniform RFID security framework is that the business rules for protecting access to EPC data can be complex. The power of an EPC code is that it provides access key to data about a product and its business context. For example, the product could be an F15 Engine GE504 destined for Pakistan, and the associated business information could be that the engine was shipped from Boeing on 12/5/2007 and was part of a purchase order (PO) that is stored on http://boeing.SAPsecretsite/secretPlace.aspx. Thus, the resource being accessed is potentially more than just an EPC code. Authentication and authorization decisions depend on all of the associated data: EPC, time, business event, PO number. Further, the user might have authorization to see some of the data but not all of it. An authorization system itself must be able to look up a business rule that is defined by EPC, shipper, date, PO context, and requester identity. Some policies are confidential in themselves due to business reasons, so only parts of them are exchangeable. At present there are no widely accepted standardized business rule languages which can express such complex rules.
In this paper, several strategies are advocated and justified to solve the security issues associated with RFID networks.
• An adequate security framework must avoid centralized identity providers in order to handle the wide variety and huge number of parties involved in RFID networks.
• Provenance challenges is introduced to solve trust issues in RFID networks.
• In order to ensure that business rules are interchangeable 978-1-4244-4581-3/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE between agents in different domains, business rule vocabularies which are available in a machine understandable format is defined. Moreover, the set of vocabularies can be referred to and shared by agents in different domains.
• A business rule language for RFID networks is defined in this paper. This business rule language an RFID security framework allows resource managers to perform access control dynamically instead of searching static identity lists.
Based on these strategies, IISS, an interoperable internetscale security framework for RFID networks is designed and implemented. IISS is a World Wide Web-based framework for an agent in RFID networks to perform authentication with another agent from a different domain by reasoning over queries and related policies described in RDF-s [3] and OWL [4] . The main contribution of this paper is that it provides a solution to security problems in the RFID networks on which multiple partners can rely. Moreover, in RFID networks, IISS is shown to be the first security machanism that performs authentication based on an aggregation of business rules, enterprise information, and RFID tag information. Third, an ontology for describing entities and business rules in RFID networs is developed. Fourth, it introduces very light weight provenance chanllenges to solve the trust issue in RFID networks. Finally, IISS provides a way to express complex business rules in RFID networks.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II summarizes related work. Section III presents the IISS framework and infrastructure. Section IV describes the ontologies in the IISS framework. Section V describes the policy structure and reasoning engine in IISS. Section VI discusses the implementation of IISS and its performance based on a supply chain use case, and Section VII concludes this work and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The EPCglobal Network, known as the RFID network, describes components and interfaces for the EPC-related information interchange between servers that contain information related to items identified by EPC numbers. In the RFID network, the EPC-related information is stored in EPC information services (EPCIS). By installing EPCIS, the disparate applications are able to leverage EPC data both within and across enterprises [5] .
Most research work on RFID security and privacy issue targets the communication between tags and readers. This work includes blocker tags [6] , and the protocols by Henrici and Muller [7] , Juels et al. [8] , Ohkubo et al. [9] , Feldhofer et al. [3] , Molnar and Wagner [10] . However, in order to enable participants in the EPCglobal Network to gain a shared view of the disposition of EPC-bearing objects within a relevant business context, the security scheme needs to be implemented at the information transmission level between agents distributed throughout the internet. There is some work in progress in the context of existing Web standards such as Privacy Preferences (P3P) [11] , and XML markup languages such as SAML [12] , EPAL [13] and XACML [14] . However, none of this research is target at developing policy descriptions specific to RFID networks. There are also no tools for helping users in RFID networks evaluate queries by referring to policy rules, especially when various rulesets interact.
We presented the preliminary ideas of the IISS previously [15] . This paper describes more mature design of the IISS. The design in this paper covers the topic of how files are distributed and stored in the IISS system. This paper also abstracts the policy structure in the IISS protocal, and presents the design of the policy engine in detail. In addition, this paper demonstrates the performance of the IISS. At the same time, we provide solutions to improve the IISS efficiency, and prove the IISS's feasibility when applied to supply chains in the industry based on the IISS's performance.
III. IISS FRAMEWORK AND INFRASTRUCTURE
In an RFID network, a relying party needs three kinds of information related to EPC-bearing objects to decide whether or not to give permission to a querying party to access particular EPC-related information:enterprise level, business rule level, and item level. The first, enterprise level information, concerns the participating enterprises' identities. This kind of information includes an enterprise's name, an enterprise's address, and business description(e.g. a manufacturer of a particular RFID-bearing item, a shipper of a particular RFIDbearing item, a government legal authority). Business rule level information concerns rules or policies that are associated with an EPC-bearing object in a particular business context. The third kind of information, item level information, is about an EPC-bearing object itself, such as its provenance information or EPC-related information. The EPC related information includes what the EPC is; and when where, and at which business step the EPC has been read. IISS is the first scheme in RFID networks that performs authentication and authorization based on the integration of the information from all of the three levels.
In order to perform authentication based on the integration of the information from all three of the levels, the IISS framework is composed of five modules which process different portions of the information: (1) an EPCIS, which stores EPC data generated by RFID readers; (2) a Provenance Server, which stores the provenance information of each RFID tag-bearing object; (3) a Rule and Policy Engine, which collects relevant policy information or proofs and generates permissions after reasoning over the collected information; (4) an Identity Selector; (5) and Identity Providers, which issue identity tokens. The EPCIS and the Provenance Server store and process item-level information. The Rule and Policy Engine stores and processes business policy related information. The Identity Provider and Identity Selector work together to provide enterprise identity information. Figure 1 illustrates the interactions between these modules. Figure 2 represents the infrastructure of the IISS system. The infrastructure is composed by a data storage layer, a data processing layer, and a data resource layer.
A. IISS stores and components
At the bottom of IISS infrastructure sits the IISS ontology store. It provides general vocabularies describing information in RFID networks. Because all the agents in the IISS framework share an underlying ontology store, they can interoperate with each other by treating the store as a "blackboard". Above the IISS ontology store, there are six RDF stores serving as the foundation of the IISS system that utilizes the IISS data model. The six RDF stores are identity store, query store, proof store, requirement policy store, verification policy store, and EPC store.
On top of these RDF stores sit components that process information residing in the RDF stores. Those components are identity selector, query generator, proof collector, reasoning engine, policy writer, and provenance writer. These components are simply resources in IISS that store their RDF statements in respective RDF stores and have pieces of executable code called methods that can be invoked to the input and generate the statements in the form of RDF. The policy writer is responsible for generating an EPC-related policy pair (a requirement policy and a verification policy) according to inputs from resource managers and storing these policies to right policy stores. The provenance writer is responsible for receiving provenance information from its previous provenance server in an EPC-associated supply chain and adding provenance information to its EPC store. The query generator initiates query statements which describe queried EPCs and their supporting proof files. After a query statement is generated, it is stored in the query store by the query generator. The identity selector retrieves its enterprise's identity tokens from identity providers and stores those identity tokens into its identity store. The proof collector retrieves provenance statements from the EPC store and identity token information from the identity store and combines them into proof files that are used to support queries.
Sitting at the core of the IISS infrastructure is the reasoning engine. The reasoning engine retrieves query statements from querying parties and reasons them over verification policies. The reasoning engine makes final decisions on whether or not to give incoming queries access permissions.
On top of these middle tier components is the data resource layer. The data resource layer includes servers which provide information in the IISS framework. They are identity providers, policy input proxies and provenance servers. Identity providers can be any authentication authorities on the Web. The policy input proxy is a user interface tool allowing resource managers who are not familiar with RDF formats to input English-like representation of business methods, entities, conditions and actions. Provenance servers transmit, receive and provide EPC-related provenance information.
B. File distribution
IISS is developed within the Semantic Web Framework. In the IISS framework, all the RDF statements are stored in the form of Notation 3 (N3) [16] files. Notation 3 is a compact and readable alternative to RDF's XML syntax, and is extended to allow greater expressiveness. Each N3 file has a suffix of "n3". One feature of the Semantic Web is that RDF statements can be distributed anywhere on the Web as long as there is an URI to identify the RDF statements. As shown in the following figure, all the N3 files in the IISS framework are deployed throughout the Web.
The distribution of statements in IISS on the Web should follow four rules:
1) Information and instances that are common to all the agents should be defined as ontologies which are accessible for all the agents throughout RFID networks. 2) Information or instances unique to a certain enterprise should be defined within the enterprise's domain.
3) Files with sensitive information, such as N3 files in verification policy stores and the EPC stores, are kept within enterprises' repositories. These files are not published on the Web. 4) Files without sensitive information, such as N3 files in requirement policy stores, query stores and proof stores, are published with URIs at which other agents are able to retrieve RDF statements in these files to do inference. According to these four rules, all the files in IISS are deployed as shown in Figure 3 . An N3 file in the IISS ontology store that defines the IISS ontologies and common instances is published on the Web with the URI address, http://18.78.3.68/IISS/ontIISS.n3. All the agents in the IISS framework share this file to generate their own RDF statements based on the common vocabularies defined in the IISS ontology file.
IV. ONTOLOGIES IN IISS
To model rules as mechanism for declaratively specifying business logic and authentication and authorization policies in RFID networks, some ontologies, namely concepts, relations, and instances about RFID and security are introduced in the IISS framework. The IISS ontologies reflect RFID domainspecific entities and allow for description of security logic supporting RFID business processes in the form of rules. Thus, by using an inference engine such as Cwm [17] , these security properties can be applied automatically during runtime.
The IISS ontologies include the Provenance Ontology, Identity Ontology, EPC Ontology, Query Ontology and Policy Ontology. These ontologies are illustrated in Figure 4 . All agents in IISS can describe their own data as instances of the classes in those onotologies. The data are connected to each other via the properties defined in the ontologies. Given the ontologies and the semantics relations among them, the IISS framework can make logical inferences about the consistency between evidences and policy rules.
V. POLICY STRUCTURE AND REASONING ENGINE IN IISS
The IISS framework provides an intermediary business rule language for RFID networks. IISS rule language allows resource managers to perform access control dynamically instead of searching static identity lists. The language also employs a policy structure which allows the enterprise to publish only an abstract interface composed of the necessary input parameters for satisfying the business rule instead of publishing the entire business criteria for EPC-related authorization.
A. Policy structure
To describe an access control rule for a resource in the IISS framework, two policy entries are required: a requirement policy and a verification policy. These two policies are defined independently of each other. The requirement policy describes what kind of proofs a querying party needs to collect to validate a query on a particular EPC-related resource. The verification policy is an inference rule which describes what actions a relying party should take given a specified set of antecedents. Only the requirement policies are accessible to querying parties, acting as an abstract protocol interface to the policy collection. The verification policies are kept confidential by relying parties. In this way, enterprises are able to publish the minimal amount of information necessary about their access control policies in order for users to receive access privileges. This strategy is necessary because access control policies in themselves may contain sensitive, or confidential, business information that enterprises do not want to or can not publish. For example, enterprises should not publish EPCrelated provenance challenges.
The IISS framework utilizes Notation3(N3) language [18] to represent the policies in the IISS framework. The N3 language has the required expressivity and is convenient to read and write. To demonstrate this, an example policy from a relying party is described here. How that policy would be translated into the N3 language is also shown. In order to access the a page about the purchase order related to EPC 010000A8900016F000169D, the querying party must prove that he has an OpenID authenticated by the Government and can pass the provenance challenge. The business relationship in this policy can be represented by the IISS ontologies as shown in Figure 5 .
The policy above can be interpreted by a Requirement Policy and a Verification Policy as follows. The Requirement Policy shows that the querying party needs to provide identity from the Governmnet, the identity format should be OpenID, and the querying party needs to provide the EPC's provenance challenge to access the EPC-related purchase order. The Verification Policy shows that if the querying party can provide the same EPC-realted provenance as the one that the relying party knows, and an OpenID from the Government as http://main.goveropenid.com, the querying party is allowed to access the EPC-related purchase order. The logic behinds this policy can be represented as the following logical formula:
Requirement Policy:
com)∧ issuer(iden, Government)∧ has-enterprise-identity(x, iden)} ⇒ give-permission-to(x, P O)
All the relationships and instances in the policy above can be represented by the IISS ontologies.
B. Reasoning Engine in the IISS framework
The IISS framework's policy reasoning engine accepts a query about a resource in an RFID network as a Query instance. It collects relevant information from the IISS framework for fielding the query, and replies to the querying party in regards to access rights to the data.
In the IISS framework, the reasoning engine is implemented with software written in C#, Python, Cwm [17] , and N3 [18] rules. The IISS framework relies on N3 semantics and Cwm functionality to integrate and reason over the IISS access policies.
The core of the reasoning engine is made up of an abstract model, as a set of definitions and inference rules, written in N3 and stored in the engine.n3 file. Cwm [17] , as a general purpose data processor, is used as the reasoning engine for the N3 rule language(one of the features of the processor). The reasoning engine accepts a Query instance as input and retrieves the logic representing the relationship between the requested resource and relevant policies. The input can be serialized either in RDF/XML [19] or N3 [16] , both being understandable to Cwm.
Upon receiving some input, the reasoning engine parses it to retrieve the attributes provided by the querying party and the information regarding the requested resource. When it has retrieved the necessary data, the engine processes the files which are defined in N3 [16] . The results of the reasoning indicate what actions the relying party should take, and the outputs is serialized in RDF/XML or N3. The relying parties can then use these results to decide which resources to which the query parties should be granted access.
In the case where the query and associated data satisfy the antecedents of an inference rules in the EPC's verification policy file, the reasoning engine will always return the consequences of the satisfied inference rules. These results describe the action the relying party will take regarding the query or the querying party. One such action would be giving permission to access the requested resource.
Formally, the reasoning engine can be modeled as follows. When the necessary prefixes are included that provide access to function namespaces, the reasoning engine can be defined as a set of N3 rules.
A reasoning engine can be accessed by a relying party or a resource manager through the Cwm command-line interface or in Python via its Application Program Interface (API).
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND IISS PERFORMANCE
IISS's data model is implemented using the Resource Description Framework (RDF), a descriptive logic framework for encoding metadata on the World Wide Web. The modules are implemented in the object-oriented C# language, and using Windows Communication Foundation libraries. Cwm [17] , a general purpose data processor written in Python, is used as the reasoning engine for parsing and merging ontologies and for making logic inferences over Query instances and Policy instances. A web portal is provided to let users generate policies for particular ECP events.
The potential usability of the IISS framework's protocol in the real supply chains of industry is shown by experimenting with IISS using a supply chain EPC network simulator as a test bed. The supply chain EPC network simulator was developed by the AUTOID lab at MIT in order to estimate the quantity of message flow in the future EPC network infrastructure.
A. IISS performance
The IISS's performance are tested in a Dell PC machine with the following configuration.
Processor: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU 5130 @ 2.00GHz 1.99GHz.
Memory (RAM): 3069 MB, System type: 32-bit Operation System.
Network speed: 100.0Mbps. Two experiments are designed to test how IISS efficiency is affected by the size of an EPC.n3 file, and to find the real bottleneck which was causing the linear growth behavior relating to the number of EPC entries in the IISS protocol. Both experiments really point out that one key characteristic, the size of the EPC.n3 file, is the major contributor to slowdown of the IISS framework's performance There are two solutions to optimize the IISS protocol's performance.
The first one is to partition the EPC.n3 file and index these partitions. When the reasoning engine and the provenance writer in the IISS framework process the EPC.n3 file, they are able to use the index to find the partition which contains the entry they need. Instead of having one EPC.n3 file, the EPC store contains multiple EPCn.n3 files. The index algorithm used in testing is described in the equation:
100 queries over 3000 EPC entries in different EPC.n3 partition senarios is tested. The result shows that the latency of the IISS protocol drops sharply from 7292.82 ms per query to 398 .62 ms per query when the partition size of EPC.n3 files decrease from 1000 EPC entries per file to 1 EPC entry per file. A latency below a half second would make IISS feasible when applied to supply chains in the industry.
The second solution proposed for optimizing the IISS framework's performance is by generating policies for batched EPC queries. Instead of linking a Query instance and a policy to a particular EPC, parties can link them to a batch of EPCs with common features, such as the EPCs of the same batch of products from one manufacturer. In this way, a relying party does not have to validate queries individually under the circumstances that the queries have the same security properties and the target EPCs have the same access policies in a relying party.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The paper presented five major contributions. First, a solution to security problems in the RFID networks on which multiple partners with different identity schemes can rely -the Interoperable Internet-Scale Security (IISS) Framework is developed. By employing this IISS protocol, parties in RFID networks do not need to give up their original security schema to adapt a unified technique or standard.
Second, IISS is shown to be the first security mechanism that performs authentication based on an aggregation of business context, enterprise information, and RFID tag information.
Third, an ontology for describing entities and business rules in RFID networks is developed.
Fourth, it is shown that IISS provides a dynamic mechanism to regulate access control of EPC-related resources. This scheme is an improvement over role-based access control solutions. It gives an enterprise more flexibility when defining its resource access criteria. Moreover, it will save resource managers a significant amount of labor from maintaining the role database and identity list.
Fifth, it is shown how IISS introduces very light weight provenance challenges in order to solve the trust problem in RFID networks.
Through the IISS ontologies provide vocabularies for describing business relationships, they are not complete enough to cover all the business relationships in RFID networks. Further input from the EPC community's is necessary in order to enrich the ontologies for describing various business contexts.
